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1HALF A CENTURY OF POPULATION FORECASTING IN THE
NETHERLANDS
1.- Introduction
The first Dutch population forecast was published in 1921 when Prof. Dr. C. A. Verrijn
Stuart predicted a population of 27.5 million for the year 2020. After a few unpublished
forecasts, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) published its first projections ´Berekeninig
omtrent de toekomstige loop der Nederlandse bevolking´ (Calculations of future paths
of the population of the Netherlands), Forecast 1950 (CBS, 1951). Since then over
twenty-five regular forecasts have been made. From the mid-eighties they were
produced annually and from 1997 every other year a long-term forecast and short-term
forecast. The last forecast, Forecast 2001, predicts a population of 17.5 million for the
year 2020, 10 million less than in the forecast of 1921. Other (regular) national
population forecasts have not been published by other institutes than the CBS.
Beside regular population forecasts, some experimental calculations, high and low
varieties and scenarios, and other exercises were made. These are not treated here.
As is common practice, the forecasts will be named after the first year for which
assumptions were made and not according to the year of publication (although these
could coincide) . For example, Forecast 1950 was published in 1951, but the starting
population was that of the first of January of 1950 and therefore this forecast will be
addressed as Forecast 1950. No detailed information is available for Forecast 1951 and
Forecast 1959, therefore these will be omitted from some tables and graphs.
An overview of forecasts made before 1950 can be found in CBS (1951). Population
Forecasts made after 1950 were also discussed in De Beer (1990), Cruijsen and Zakee
(1991), De Jong (1995) and Gjaltema and Broekman (2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b).
In the next chapter a more detailed description will be given of the official forecasts
made in the Netherlands. It will concentrate on the changes in assumptions and in
methodology compared to the previous forecast. Chapter three discusses the assumption
levels, methodological changes, the advice groups used in making the forecasts, and the
2variable level. The forecast performance in terms of forecast error is subject to chapter
4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in chapter 5.
2.- Overview of the Forecasts
In the following section the forecasts made in the second half of the twentieth century
will be described. The main changes in the three components and the effect on the total
population will be discussed. A discussion of the forecast errors can be found in chapter
four. Table 1 gives an overview of the main assumptions of the forecasts made in the
past fifty years. In Table 2 the situation as forecasted for the year 2000 can be found
(more information can also be found in graphs 1, 2, 8, 14, and 20 of chapter four).
Table 1  Main indicators population forecast: end values
Forecast life-expectancies
Start-year end-year total population TFR net-migration male female
x1000
1950 1980 13036 2.28 0 69.4 71.5
1951 1981 14270 -50000 69.4 71.5
1959 1981 14649 -20000 69.4 71.5
1965 2000 20977 3.22 0 72.3 79.4
1967 2000 17895 0 72.3 79.4
1970 2000 17058 2.24 0 69.5 76.6
1972 2000 15727 0 69.5 76.6
1975 2010 15007 1.69 0 71.4 77.8
1980 2025 15573 1.73 6000 73.3 79.5
1984 2035 13361 1.50 0 74.5 81.5
1985 2020 13394 1.50 0 74.5 81.0
1986 2035 14599 1.65 0 74.5 80.5
1987 2035 15777 1.65 20000 74.5 80.5
1988 2050 14857 1.65 20000 75.0 81.5
1989 2050 14879 1.65 20000 75.0 81.5
1990 2050 15326 1.65 25000 75.0 81.5
1991 2050 16430 1.80 25000 75.0 81.5
1992 2050 16668 1.80 25000 76.0 81.5
1993 2050 17293 1.80 35000 76.0 81.5
1994 2050 17152 1.80 35000 76.0 81.5
1995 2050 16991 1.80 35000 76.0 81.5
1996 2050 16874 1.70 35000 80.0 83.0
1997 2003 16149 1.60 34377 75.7 80.7
1998 2050 17230 1.70 22316 80.0 83.0
1999 2004 16339 1.67 44150 75.9 80.8
2000 2050 18005 1.75 29725 79.5 83.0
32.1.- The first thirty years
The first forecast was made in a period in which family formation nearly solely took
place within marriage. Therefore, Forecast 1950 was based upon marital fertility.
Despite a peak in the number of births in 1946, a result of an increase of young couples,
a decline in the fertility was assumed from an average of three children to just over two
children per woman. Two variants were made for marital fertility, a maximum keeping
developments after 1952 at the 1937 level (the lowest level registered till then) and a
low scenario with a continuation of the decline as had already been observed for the
years since 1875. Together with two assumptions for the percentage of woman married,
this lead to four fertility-forecasts. The base-line scenario consisted of the average of the
two extremes of these four scenarios.
In the first part of the twentieth century, the volume of immigration and emigration
tended to fluctuate extensively from year to year; years of net-inflow were followed by
years of net loss of population. Direction and content also varied from year to year.
After the Second World War, an active emigration policy was proceeded by the Dutch
government. The state of the world economy was also assumed to stimulate emigration.
Despite this, no explicit assumptions about migration were made in the final population
forecast. Implicitly it was therefore assumed that in the long-term emigration and
immigration would balance each other out. Possible direct and indirect (less births)
effects of migration on population growth were studied, however. The government’s
strife was a net-emigration of 20 to 25 thousand workers (together with their family this
would mount to a net departure of 50 thousand migrants). This exercise resulted in an
expected lowering of the population size of two million by the year 1980.
Assumptions for the mortality forecast were based upon observations from the previous
years. Levels of the 1947-1949 period were kept constant. Lack of epidemics and
selective mortality during the war had caused relative low mortality during this period
and it was assumed that these relatively low levels could be maintained. If necessary,
further downward adjustments could be made in the future. Due to population ageing,
the number of deaths would increase despite lower mortality levels.
In the foreword of Forecast 1950 it was stated that, if necessary, the forecast would be
revised. Only one year later a revision was thought to be necessary. The percentage of
married woman turned out to be higher than expected. Furthermore, the decline of the
4marital fertility turned out to be less than assumed. Because of this a revision was felt to
be necessary. Forecast 1951, therefore, predicted more births.
It neither seemed that assumptions on mortality could be maintained. In Forecast 1951
the mortality levels of the previous forecast were chosen as the highest scenario. A
logarithmic extrapolation of values observed between 1900-1909 and 1947-1949
delivered the low scenario. The base-line scenario was the average of the two extreme
values.
Forecast 1951 was made with and without explicit assumptions on migration. The
effects of two different scenarios for migration were calculated (yearly emigration of 20
and 50 thousand). It was not clarified which of the two should be considered the most
likely forecast. As in the previous forecast, immigration was assumed to be negligible.
Because emigrants were mainly young people, these assumptions increased the average
age of the population. Compared to Forecast 1951 the variant without emigration would
see the total population increase with one million by 1980.
The net result of these changes would mean an extra one million inhabitants in the year
1980 (in the version without explicit migration assumptions). More births, and to a
lesser extent, less deaths would lead to these changes.
Forecast 1959 was produced in 1959, the starting population was that of 1956 but the
population up to 1959 were observed ones (the forecast was made for the OECD which
asked for forecasts from the period 1956). Compared to the previous predictions, no
changes were made for fertility. In accordance with observed trends, mortality levels
were, again, lowered a little bit.
For migration, again estimations with and without migration were made. In the ultimate
population projections the migration component was not included though. The overall
effect on the population forecast was an increase in the total population.
A further increase in the percentage of married persons was expected in Forecast 1965.
Observations from the U.S. census were taken as maximum values for the proportion of
the population that would marry. Younger age at marriage and a concentration of first-
motherhood in the first years of marriage would lead to an increase in fertility of women
below age 30. At higher ages a decline in fertility was predicted.
Emigration had become less important in the previous years. Each time less people
moved to overseas emigration countries and more and more people were settling in the
5Netherlands. They came mainly from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. Labour
immigrants came from Southern-Europe and Turkey (the official recruitment countries).
The uncertainty of future developments was considered large and in Forecast 1965
therefore no explicit assumptions were made for migration.
The decline in mortality was again extrapolated logarithmically, now using observations
from the years 1951-1955 and 1961-1963. The only exception was made for men
between the ages 47 and 71. Mortality had risen for these ages. Because of this, more
deaths were excepted than in the pervious forecast.
Forecast 1965 became known for its large error. It was not considered unlikely that the
population for the year 2000 would increase to 21 million. No assumptions were made
for the years beyond 2000, however, in an evaluation a population of 50 million was not
considered impossible for the year 2050. The main causes of error were erroneous
assumptions of the fertility component.
Forecast 1967 was a revision of Forecast 1965. The decline in marital fertility made an
adjustment necessary. The decline from 1964 to 1965 was the fastest ever observed till
then. Current Amsterdam levels (lowest of the Netherlands) were taken as the minimum
for the longer term. No changes were made in the assumptions for the other two
components (migration and mortality). However, due to a change in the age-structure,
the number of deaths would decline slightly.
In Forecast 1970 a methodological change took place. Marital duration specific fertility
rates were introduced a shift to a more longitudinal approach. A decline in marital
fertility was expected, though there would be a compensating effect because the
percentage of persons married would increase. Together with an increase in the number
of woman at marital age, this would lead to an increase in the number of births. First
signs of postponement were noticed which was reflected in the assumptions.
After 1964, there was a continuation of labour migration. Nevertheless, again no
assumptions were made for migration. Some global calculations were made for the
years 1970-1975, though. It was assumed that immigration from the Mediterranean
countries was only a temporary affair; migrants would return after some years. More
attention was paid to migration streams from now onward.
Total mortality was predicted more or less accurately in Forecast 1965. However, age-
specific figures corresponded less to ex-ante observations. A new methodology was
6introduced for mortality. Four causes of death were distinguished. For each category,
the proportional change between 1961-1965 and 1966-1968 in the non-weighted
probabilities of death were extrapolated linearly. The sum gave the total age-specific
probabilities of dying. These would increase for nearly all ages for men. Woman would
see an increase below age 55 and a decrease in mortality above these ages. The total
effect would mean a decline in the life expectancy for men (-1.4 on the long-term),
while that of woman would increase slightly (+0.3 years). The overall number of deaths
would increase.
The lowering of survival probabilities for men resulted in a decline of the forecasted
population. More births would not outbalance this but would lead to more people in the
younger age groups.
Two years later the number of births again appeared to be forecasted too high. Across
all ages and duration of marriage a decline had taken place. It mainly concerned a
decline in parity three and higher. The decline in the ultimate number of children
seemed to have increased while the postponement in the first years of marriage had
continued. Forecast 1972 therefore predicted fewer births.
In Forecast 1972, no changes were made for migration and mortality. These changes
meant a decline in the size of the younger age groups and in the total population.
The decline in marital fertility was larger than expected and the number of marriages
less than foreseen. Forecast 1975 assumed a continuation of the decline in the
percentage of married woman. Contrary to the previous two forecasts, the age of the
woman at marriage was no longer included in the forecast model. In its place, birth
order was introduced as part of the calculation model. More general assumptions were
that there would be a further acceptance of childlessness and of the use of
contraceptives. An increase in the mean age at birth was also assumed. On the long-term
however, only slightly lower fertility rates were expected. It was further stated that the
uncertainty about the future had increased. To express this, only a high and a low
scenario were published. The choice of the most likely developments was left to the
forecast users.
The ‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regerings beleid’ (scientific council for
government policy) had advised to pay more attention to migration in the next forecast.
Beside a scenario without explicit assumptions for migration, two alternative
7calculations were made with assumptions about migration. Again no base-line migration
forecast was made; only the extremes were given. Assumptions were only made for the
first ten years. After the tenth year migration was again set to zero. As a result of this
expected downward trend, only a limited total number of immigrants was foreseen. For
the first time the possibility was stated that migration could be more permanent than
previously expected.
Short-term forecasts of mortality had been quite accurate in the past two forecasts. Only
female mortality above age 65 was overestimated. Mortality rates as observed in the
period 1971-1974 were applied for the whole forecast period with the only exception of
infant mortality and of female mortality above age 55. Linear extrapolation of female
rates led to an increase in life expectancy of 0.8 year in Forecast 1975. Life
expectancies for men only increased slightly (0.2 year) from the previous forecast.
Table 2  Main indicators population forecast for the year 2000
Forecast Total population TFR births net-migration life expectancies Deaths
x1000 males females
1965 20977 . . 0 . . .
1967 17895 . 335200* 0 . . 142700*
1970 17058 . 293300* 0 69.5* 76.6* 161500*
1972 15727 . 217150 0 69.5 76.6 162700
1975 15099 1.66 168200 0 71.4 77.8 159950
1980 15643 1.75 189166 6000 73.3 79.5 154141
1984 15147 1.50 164138 0 74.5 81.5 143825
1985 15213 1.50 166050 0 74.5 81.0 144769
1986 15588 1.65 184794 9000 74.5 80.5 146140
1987 15718 1.65 191415 20000 74.5 80.5 146332
1988 15717 1.65 191983 20000 74.8 81.3 142658
1989 15696 1.65 192995 20000 74.8 81.3 142606
1990 15860 1.65 195403 25000 74.8 81.2 142754
1991 16015 1.73 206971 25000 74.8 81.2 142902
1992 16007 1.73 207614 25000 75.4 81.0 139774
1993 16079 1.73 209325 41000 75.4 81.0 139876
1994 15983 1.72 206866 36000 75.4 81.0 139426
1995 15881 1.72 205343 35765 75.4 81.0 139355
1996 15801 1.56 187983 33773 75.3 80.6 141176
1997 15832 1.59 192153 33773 75.3 80.6 141126
1998 15848 1.64 197836 37945 75.3 80.6 141234
1999 15862 1.64 198243 45171 75.3 80.6 140979
2000 15864 1.72 206598 52206 75.3 80.6 140991
* 1999
8As no base-line scenario was given, the average between the high and low will be used
in the evaluation. Unpublished data on migration unto 2010 are used in the comparison
of the population and age structure. Compared to the pervious forecast, all changes in
the demographic components combined would mean a lowering of the forecasted
population for the middle and long-term. Remarkable is also that for the first time an
ultimate decline of the population was forecasted. The turning point would be 2003 (see
Table 3).
2.2.-The Eighties
Forecast 1980 had some changes. The marital duration specific approach was dropped
and for the first time migration became an integrated part of the forecast. Forecasts were
also made by marital status.
An expected increase of extra-marital births and childless cohabitation reflected the new
ideas about marriage no longer being the sole institution for family formation. The
Dutch Fertility Survey (‘Onderzoek Gezindsvorming’) provided information about the
expected number of children. The end result of a thorough analysis of observed trends
in fertility and attitudes was that the total fertility rates were adjusted upwardly.
The uncertainty surrounding future paths of migration was expressed by a large margin
between the high and the low scenario of the migration forecast. Migrant streams were
divided into groups on the basis of their juridical status, sensibility to change in
government policy, stability of past developments and the availability of data. Migration
experts were consulted to support the assumptions. It was assumed that the Netherlands
was an immigration country and that it would remain being so. Restrictive government
policies were seen as the main check on migration. Migration from Surinam and the
Dutch Antilles was assumed to be temporary and in the longer run it would be replaced
by labour migration from the Mediterranean recruitment countries. Furthermore,
migration related to family formation was expected to end before 1990 and marital
migration would increase up till 1985.
Mortality assumptions were only made for the period 1980-1990. Mortality rates were
kept constant for the years after 1990.
Negative influences on life expectancy, caused mainly by social-economic and cultural-
technological developments, would not outpace the effects of medical improvements,
9better hygiene and feeding practices, and preventive medical health care. Mortality rates
would decline slightly, and sex differentials would decrease somewhat. First, life
expectancies were fixed for 1990 after which mortality rates were deduced from
interpolated figures.
The changes to the previous forecast of a little bit more births, net immigration (instead
of zero), and slightly lower mortality, would result in a larger population size.
A few years later it appeared that Forecast 1980 took far less account of postponement
of births. Fertility rates were taken too high for young woman. In Forecast 1984
expected total fertility rates were lowered from 1.75 to 1.50 children per woman.
Continuing emancipation and change of economic value of children would lead to a
preference for fewer children. Childlessness was also expected to increase. As the
makers were less sure about the path of fertility, they increased the margin between the
high and the low scenario. Because it was felt that the relation between marriage and
childbirth would become less strict, the distinction between marital and non-marital
fertility was dropped.
For the migration component, predicted net-migration was lowered from six thousand in
the previous to three thousand per year in Forecast 1984. For the first time the
administrative corrections were also forecasted. These are mainly corrections for
emigration; migrants that did not gave notice to the municipal population registration
about their departure. In later forecasts administrative corrections were included in
migration. As these corrections were forecasted to be the same in size as the net-
migration, the expected inflow of people was therefor zero.
Extensive research also led to a change in mortality assumptions. Improvements across
all ages were expected for both sexes. In contrary to the previous forecast, no decline in
the difference between male and female life expectancy at birth was predicted. Medical
developments, more security, further improvements in preventive healthcare and more
free time would improve survival chances. Negative effects would come from
environmental pollution, unemployment, individualisation, and stress. After fixing life
expectancies for 1995, age-specific mortality rates were deduced. Because it was
considered to be impossible to make assumptions for the longer run, rates were kept
constant for the years after 1995.
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The changes would mean less population growth. Fore example, for the year 2000 the
forecasted total population was nearly half a million lower than in the previous forecast.
The year in which the population would start to decline changed to 2008 (from 2003).
Because of an increased demand for recent population projections it was decided to
launch a new forecast every year. The main changes in Forecast 1985 were a slight
increase in the median age at childbirth and an increase of female life expectancy.
For the short-term more migrants were expected. On the longer term however, the
increase would be balanced by a similar increase in predicted administrative corrections.
The total population would increase more because of these changes than as predicted in
Forecast 1984. Population decline was now expected to start in 2004, four years earlier
than in the previous forecast (Table 3).
The last two forecasts had not assumed enough children for woman at higher ages. Total
fertility rates were therefore increased from 1.50 to 1.65 in Forecast 1986. The decline
in fertility levels at younger ages was maintained.
In Forecast 1986 it was explicitly stated that the Netherlands was, and would remain so
for the time being, an immigration country. For the longer-term the number of migrants
was fixed at nine thousand (including administrative corrections).
For mortality, a high and a low forecast were added, life expectancies at birth deviated
from the base-line scenario with 0.5 years in the final year. Long-term female life
expectancies were lowered with 0.5 years. No changes were made for males.
Again the forecast of the total population was adjusted upwardly. Larger younger age
groups because of more births, and less at higher ages because of less old-aged woman,
made some changes to the age structure.
Short-term fertility forecasts were lowered slightly in Forecast 1987. The main change
from the previous forecast was an increase of the expected net-migration. Long-term
forecasts were now set at 20 thousand. This was, still a decline in comparison to
observations of the previous years. The mortality forecast saw no change.
These changes would lead to a slightly different age-structure and to a higher total
population. The year in which the population would start to decline was put three years
further into the future, from 2007 to 2010.
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In Forecast 1988, again only small downward adjustments were made for the short-term
fertility. Short-term migration was set a bit higher.
Observed mortality was again lower than previously forecasted. The relative high
mortality registered in 1985 and 1986 was caused by the extreme cold winters. Life
expectancies at birth were increased with 0.5 years for men and 1.0 years for women.
Increased uncertainty was expressed in larger margins in the low and high scenarios.
The number of forecasted deaths had never been as low as in Forecast 1988.
Changes in size and age-structure of the population were very small.
In Forecast 1989, for the third year in a row, short-term fertility forecasts were lowered
slightly. The average age of mother at childbirth was increased.
The number of net-migrants was increased slightly for the short-term, but remained
unchanged for the middle and longer-term. Administrative corrections are now included
in the migration assumptions and are no longer forecasted separately. To express the
increased uncertainty of the forecasters, the margins between high and low forecast
were made larger.
Mortality assumptions only changed for the short-term for females.
As with the previous forecast, changes in the age-breakdown and size of the total
population would be small.
Table 3  Forecast year with highest population size
Forecast maximum Year Forecast maximum year
mln mln
1950 13.0 1980 1988 16.2 2010
1951 12.2 1981 1989 16.2 2010
1959 14.6 1981 1990 16.5 2023
1965 21.0 2000 1991 17.1 2030
1967 17.9 2000 1992 17.3 2031
1970 17.1 2000 1993 17.7 2033
1972 15.7 2000 1994 17.6 2033
1975 15.1 2003 1995 17.4 2033
1980 15.8 2008 1996 17.2 2034
1984 15.2 2004 1997 16.1 2003
1985 15.3 2004 1998 17.4 2036
1986 15.8 2007 1999 16.3 2004
1987 16.1 2010 2000 18.1 2040
12
2.3.- The Nineties
After lowering short-term assumptions in the previous three forecasts, Forecast 1990
saw an increase in the short-term fertility expectations.
Observed net-(im)migration had been higher than forecasted earlier. Assumptions were
subsequently adjusted. In the preparation of Forecast 1990, more attention was given to
time-series analysis in order to support qualitative assumptions. The Schengen
Agreement and the asylum treaty were signed. It was thought that the number of asylum
seekers would be stable. For the first time the presence of illegal immigrants was
mentioned. With the increase of the Turkish and Moroccan population at marital ages,
an increase in family formative migration was expected. Remigration was perceived as
a minor phenomenon.
It was thought that the fluctuations in mortality at the end of the 1980s were caused by
flue epidemics. Therefore, no changes were made for the mortality component in
Forecast 1990.
The total population would increase because of higher net-migration. The peak of the
total population would now be reached in 2023, thirteen years later than in the previous
forecast. Higher age groups would be least effected by these changes.
For the first time since Forecast 1986, long-term fertility assumptions were put higher in
Forecast 1991. More children per woman and less childlessness would lead to more
births. The number of births would further increase because of higher assumed
migration levels for the short-term.
Only short-term migration forecasts were changed in Forecast 1991. Again assumptions
were formulated for the various sub-categories. Immigration and emigration with other
countries of the European Union was suppose to increase, however, net-migration levels
would hardly be affected. Labour migration from eastern-European countries was not
expected to be of much importance. Migration resulting from family reunification was
assumed to continue its decline, while family formative migration would increase for
the short-term (though it would decline on the long-term). Although the number of
asylum seekers would increase, more restrictive government police would lead to less
permanent settlement. Preliminary figures for 1991 showed the highest increase in the
number of immigrants since 1975. These observations were included in the short-term
migration forecast.
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As in the previous forecast, no changes were made in the mortality forecast.
The young age groups would be larger than in the previous forecast (more births).
Working-age age groups were predicted to increase more because of higher net-
migration. Again the year in which the population would start to decline was put further
away in the future: 2030.
In Forecast 1992, only minor changes were made in the short-term assumptions of
fertility.
Because the influx of migrants in the second half of 1991 declined, and continued to
decline in the first observations for 1992, the forecast was lowered. The uncertainty
about the outcome increased however; margins between the low and high variant were
higher. The largest part of the Yugoslavian refugees was not registered as immigration
(´ontheemdenstatus´).
Life expectancies at birth for males were increased with one year for the long-term.
Most gain was reached between ages 50 and 70. Females did not show the same
progression and did worse than forecasted earlier. Their expectancies were therefore
lowered for the short-term. The loss for females would not offset the gain of males and
the total number of deaths would decline.
These adjustments would lead to changes in the age and sex structure of the population.
On the short-term the total population would be slightly lower than previously
forecasted. On the long-term, however, there would be some increase.
Again, only small adjustments to fertility assumptions for the short-term were made in
the next forecast. Changes in the migration forecast for the short-term would lead to
more life births.
Forecast 1993 saw again an upward adjustment. This time also long-term assumptions
were increased. Current levels would continue until 2010. Compared to the previous
forecast this would mean more than 200 thousand extra migrants until the year 2010.
For the longer-term migration levels would still decline, however, less than in previous
forecasts was assumed. A small shift, from a decrease in immigration from Turkey and
Morocco to an increase in immigration from countries of the European Union, was
foreseen.
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No changes were made to the mortality assumptions, though the number of deaths
increased because of a larger inflow of migrants.
With 17.7 million, the maximum population size would be reached in 2033. Compared
to the previous forecast, short-term increases were small but over time the differences
would increase (to 625 thousand in 2050).
Forecast 1994, for the third time in a row, saw no real changes in the predictions of the
fertility component.
First observations suggested that immigration would be far lower than assumed in the
last forecast. This was mainly because of delayed mobility of asylum seekers from
refugee centres to ordinary homes. Only in the last case they would be inscribed in the
population registers. Forecast 1994 thus had lower short-term migration levels than the
previous.
Again the mortality observations were in line with the forecast and except for the first
year, no adjustments were made.
The changes for the first years would only lead to minor changes in population structure
and size.
In Forecast 1995, no further decline of fertility at younger ages was assumed.
Postponement would however lead to an increase of fertility at higher ages. This small
increase in fertility would be offset by an increase in childlessness. The total effect
would be a small decline in fertility.
Economic trends were considered to influence decisions on fertility and ideas about
future economic changes were subsequently used in the projections. No further decline
of fertility at younger ages and but a continuing fertility increase at higher ages was put
in the forecast model.
It turned out that the decline in the number of migrants was under-estimated. It seemed
difficult to predict the number of asylum seekers that would ultimately be inscribed in
the population registers. Government policy had also been tightened and short-term
migration forecasts were adjusted. Long-term assumptions remained unchanged.
For the third forecast in a row, no changes were made to mortality assumptions. Indirect
effects (less births and immigrants) slightly lowered the number of deaths.
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Less inflow at age zero because of a little bit less children and less net-migration on the
short-term would slightly affect the age-structure. The maximum population size was
lowered slightly as well, though the year in which the decline would start remained
2033.
An increase in childlessness is the main change in Forecast 1996. Although, forecasted
long-term fertility levels were lowered accordingly, an future increase in the total
fertility rate was still foreseen. Larger margins between the high and the low scenario
depict the increase in uncertainty about the future.
The decline in migration appeared to have stalled. Only small adjustments were made
for the short-term.
Concerning the main indicators, assumptions have always been made onto a certain
limit-year (in the last forecast 2010) For later years the assumptions were kept constant.
From Forecast 1996 onward, explicit assumptions are made for all years. Beside these
methodological changes, changes were also made to the assumptions. Male life-
expectancies were lowered for the short-term. However, now that explicit assumptions
were made for the whole forecast period, life-expectancies for the long-term were
increased with four years to 80 years. Female life-expectancies at birth were now
incremented with 1.5 years to 83.0 years. It was the first time since Forecast 1988 that
changes where made assumptions on female mortality for the long-term. Margins
between the high and low scenario were increased to express the higher uncertainty.
Forecast 1997 is a short-term forecast only. The forecasted number of births increased.
No changes were made for the migration and mortality component.
With the introduction of stochastic forecasting, a new methodology was introduced with
Forecast 1998. Instead of high and low scenarios representing the uncertainty and
boundaries of possible outcomes (with a certain subjective probability), now an error
density has to indicate the uncertainty of the forecast. Error functions are based on
observed deviation and on subjective functions.
In Forecast 1998 long-term fertility levels remained unchanged but it was expected that
these levels would be reached earlier than assumed before. After earlier upward
adjustments, childlessness was readjusted to lower levels for the long-term. Less third
and higher births would counterbalance the change.
Increased migration would also increase the number of births in later years.
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For the migration component, emigration probabilities were introduced (instead of
number of emigrants). A distinction is made across age, sex and country of birth. In the
model, immigration effects emigration in later years. Those born outside the
Netherlands have higher probabilities of emigration. Further, older immigrants have
higher probabilities of emigration than younger. The distinction between non-nationals
and nationals was dropped. Because assumptions on emigration probabilities are
specified according to the country of birth of the individual and not of his parents, it was
implicitly assumed that second-generation immigrants (born in the Netherlands but one
or more parents born outside) show the same tendencies as the non-migrant population.
These changes lead to an increase in net-migration on the short-term. In contrary, long-
term forecasts were lower than the previous five forecasts. The later was because of an
increase in the number of emigrants. The emigration probabilities would decline, but
because of a larger stock of foreign-born population, the number of emigrants would
increase.
Mortality assumptions were the same as in the previous two forecast (only the first year
was adjusted).
After four times in a row a decline (if we do not count the short-term forecast of 1997),
the effect of the changes in the components now meant an increase in the predicted
maximum population size. The maximum size of 17.4 million would be reached in the
year 2036, a few years later than predicted in the previous (long-term) forecast.
Again higher fertility levels were assumed in Forecast 1999 for the short-term. Small
changes were also made for emigration probabilities and for the number of immigrants.
The mortality component only changed for the first forecast year.
Because the number of woman that ultimately would have two children increased in
Forecast 2000 (and the number with only one child decreased), the number of births
would increase again.
Again short-term adjustments more in line with recent trends were made. The long-term
forecast of the net-migration was increased, though not to the levels of the forecasts
from the mid-90s.
Assumptions for the short and middle-term changed slightly. For both males as females
the life-expectancy at birth was increased. Long-term expectancies for males, however,
were lowered with 0.5 year. For the first time a trend-model was used describing the
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mortality trends since 1900. Influences from smoking behaviour and other life-style
effects were taken into account (Van Hoorn & De Beer, 2001).
Since Forecast 1965, Forecast 2000 forecasted the highest maximum population. The
population would grow to 18.1 million in 2040 before declining to 18.0 in 2050. This is
more than 750 thousand more than in the previous forecast but still about 3 million
below the maximum of Forecast 1965.
Above, twenty-six forecasts have been described into more detail. This has been done
mainly in relation to the changes made in comparison to the previous forecast. An
overview of the changes made to the forecast in relation to the previous forecast can be
found in Table 4.
Table 4  Main changes from previous population forecast
forecast short-term (0-4 years after start) middle-term (5-14 years after start
Births migration deaths total births migration deaths total
1951  + + + *  (- - -) * + + + + + *  (- - -) + + + +
1959 * *  (+ + +) + + +  - * *  (+ + +) + + + +
1965 + + + *  (+ +) - - + + + + + *  (+ +) - - - + + +
1967 - - - * + - - - - - - * + - - -
1970 + * - - + * * - - -  *
1972 - - - * * - - - - - * * - - -
1975 - - - *  (+ + +) + * - - - *  (+ +) + - - -
1980 + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
1984 - - - - + - - - - - - - + + - - -
1985 + + - + + * - +
1986 + + + + - + + + + + + - + + +
1987 - + + + + + + * + +
1988 - * + * * * + *
1989 - + * * * * * -
1990 + + + * + + + + * + + +
1991  * + + * + + + + * + + +
1992 * - * * * * + *
1993 * + * * * + + * + +
1994 * - - * - - - * - -
1995 - - - * - - * * * - -
1996 - - - - - - - * * - - -
1997 + * * + * * * *
1998 + + * + + * * + +
1999 * + * + * * * *
2000 + + + + + + + + + + +
>10% >25000 >10% >1% >10% >25000 >10% >1%
+ + / - - 5 – 10% 10-25000 5 - 10% 0,5 - 1% 5 - 10% 10-25000 5 - 10% 0,5 - 1%
+ / - 1 – 5% 1-10000 1 - 5% 0,1 - 0,5% 1 - 5% 1-10000 1 - 5% 0,1 - 0,5%
* < 1% <1000 < 1% < 0,1% < 1% <1000 < 1% < 0,1%
In brackets () the variants with non-zero migration assumption
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3.- Forecast Methods
In this chapter we will first discuss the assumption levels that can be distinguished.
Next, a short overview of the methodological changes is given (a review of information
also hidden in chapter two). The third section is about the commissions of experts that
are involved in the making of the forecasts. Finally, the variable levels chosen for
further analysis are being discussed.
3.1.- Assumption Levels
We can distinguish three assumption levels (CBS 1984). These are: detailed
assumptions (model parameters like age-specific mortality rates), main assumptions
(such as life-expectancy at birth or total fertility rates), and general hypotheses (for
example, expectations about changes in family formation, life extending techniques,
government policy). For each demographic component in the forecast model
assumptions can be made at the three levels. General hypotheses give a general insight
in the expected developments in the demographic components. They function as the
overall framework for the expected trends.
Next, for the long-term values for the main assumptions are chosen. In general this are
total fertility rates for fertility, net-migration levels for migration, and life-expectancies
at birth for both sexes for the mortality component. Additional indicators can be chosen
for these components (like mean-age at first birth) or other components can be added
(like marital status and the percentage of extra-marital birth). With assumptions for the
short and middle term, observations are being extrapolated towards and connected to the
main assumptions for the long-term.
3.2.- Methodological Changes
For each component we see more or less gradual changes in methodology. From
marital-fertility rates, followed by fertility rates according to duration of marriage, to
parity and age-specific fertility rates. Other changes were from a more period approach
towards a cohort approach. From Forecast 1980 onward, results from the Dutch family
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and fertility survey (‘Onderzoek Gezinsvorming’) are used to support the assumption
making. General hypotheses became especially important after 1975.
Migration has often been left out of the forecast. Only since Forecast 1980 migration
became an integral part of the forecast. Before only some calculations with the effect of
migration were done. Implicitly these forecast without migration assumed zero net-
migration. In contrary to fertility and mortality, the population at risk is difficult to
define for immigration. The population of the countries from which the migrants move
to the Netherlands could be defined as the population at risk, but this is not a workable
concept. In practice, main assumptions are formulated for the number of net-migrants.
The population at risk for emigrants is better to define. Since Forecast 1998 emigration
probabilities are used. Another characteristic of migration is that, unlike birth and death,
it is a reversible and repeatable process. The number of sub-divisions into countries of
origin and destination and into migration motive also changed over time. First, national
and non-nationals were distinguished. As the Netherlands moved from an emigration to
an immigration country, destinations like North-America and Australia changed into
countries of origin like Morocco and Turkey. At the end of the 1980s the influence of
asylum seekers increases and subsequently more attention is given to these groups.
The so called Administrative Corrections are corrections on the population registration
made by the municipality offices. In general these relate to persons that have left the
municipality (and country) but have not de-registered from the municipality records. At
first they were treated and forecasted separately, but since Forecast 1989 they are
included in the migration assumptions.
Because male and female mortality rates are rather different, mortality is distinguished
by sex. Assumptions about increasing or decreasing differences between the sexes are
often made in the forecasts.
First only simple (logarithmic) extrapolations were made for the short-term. For the
long-term mortality rates were kept constant. The period for which explicit assumptions
were made increased step by step, but only from Forecast 1996 onward assumptions
were made for the whole forecast period (instead of keeping them constant for example
after the year 2010). In Forecast 1970, mortality causes of death were included in the
forecast model. As it did not give the expected improvement they were dropped in the
next forecasts. They are studied, however, in order to formulate general assumptions
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about mortality. Smoking behaviour was found to be one of the strongest factors linked
to the level and change of mortality and it could explain a large part of the difference
between males and females.
3.3.- Advice Group
In making the forecasts, the statistical office is advised by external experts. In 1967 the
first working-group on population forecasting methodology was formed with members
of the Dutch planning agencies and of academic institutes. The main expert-group is the
Commission of Advice for Population forecasts (“Commissie van Advies voor de
Bevolkingsprognose” ) which was installed in 1975 by the Central Commission for
Statistics (“Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek”, CCS). Various ministries and
planning agencies are represented in this commission. Experts in the field of fertility,
mortality, migration, and household demography resort under the auspices of this
working-group. Next to these experts-groups, the appraisal of acknowledged experts is
used on a more ad-hoc basis. For example, the introduction of the chort-approach in
1970 was stimulated by a working-group. Another example was that as a result of a note
of advice by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (“Wetenschapelijke Raad
voor het Regeringsbeleid”) and further stimulated by the OECD and the EEC, more
attention was given to migration. International consultation between forecasters  is co-
ordinated by Eurostat.
3.4.- Variable levels
Main assumptions on future developments of fertility are generally formulated on the
level of the total fertility rates. However, what we want to predict is the total number of
births. These form the natural inflow of the population and therefore determine the error
in the forecast of the population caused by the fertility component. Because of this the
concentration in the qualitative comparison will be on number of births. A more result
oriented approach therefore. Another reason for not focusing on fertility rates is that
these are not published is that for all forecasts.
If explicit assumptions on migration were made, it was in terms of total numbers. These
subsequently had to be divided across age and sex. Only recently other methods were
introduced. In the next chapter net-migration will therefore be used to evaluated the
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error in the migration assumptions. The accuracy of the various sub-groups (country of
origin and/or by reason) of migrants will not be discussed.
In line with fertility and migration, the errors in number of deaths will mainly be used in
the evaluation of the mortality component. They determine the natural ‘outflow’ of the
population. Like total fertility rates, life-expectancies at births (by sex) are not always
available.
A clear relation exists between changes in the total fertility rate and number of life
births. If the female population by age does not change, a percentage change in fertility
rates will lead to an equal change in the number of life births. This does not mean that a
one-to-one relation exists between the error in the number of births and the total fertility
rate. Because the age groups are not equal in size, age-specific fertility rates are
multiplied by the number of woman in those age groups. This means that forecast errors
in the various age-specific rates can have a different effect on the number of births. The
other way around, forecast errors in the number of woman by age caused by errors in
the forecast of migration and mortality or as a result of echo-effects (births by mothers
that were earlier forecasted as births) can lead to a discrepancy in the errors of rates
compared to numbers of births.
Main assumptions on migration have mainly been made on the number of net-migrants.
No other main-indicator has been used and using net-migration to evaluate the forecast
error seems a logic choice. Indirect effects of the other demographic components are
less strong (more births could lead to more emigrants for example). More immigrants
could lead to more emigrants because.
For mortality, main assumptions are formulated in terms of life-expectancies at birth.
Mutations on the population structure, however, are in number of deaths (by age).
Unlike with fertility, no direct relation exists between life-expectancies and number of
deaths. As reasoned with fertility, we will mainly look at the error in the number of
deaths and less to life-expectancies. Changes in the age-structure will again influence
the number of deaths (but not the life-expectancies). Indirect effects of errors in births,
and especially, migrants will influence the error in deaths. This does not have to
increase the error, because of balancing effects, the relative errors in the number of
deaths can be smaller than the relative errors in the life-expectancies.
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With births the error is concentrated in the age group zero. From year to year this
groups, and the error it causes in the age-structure, moves up in the age-pyramid. The
error in the number of migrants is spread across the age groups and will lead to less
abrupt errors in the age-structure than births. Deaths also take place across all ages but
the effect of the errors will be largest for the oldest age groups.
4.- Forecast errors
Various error measures can be used to evaluate the forecast to ex-post observations.
They each measure (slightly) different things. Here error measures are used that give a
direct and imaginable indication of the error. More complex indicators or simple but
difficult to visualise indicators are not used as these give similar results but make
interpretation less easy. In the text only graphs are used, tables with the data behind the
graphs and more detailed information can be find in Appendices. Furthermore,
indicators are used that can be accumulated across calendar or forecast time or across
components in order to prevent from having to use too many graphs.
For the evaluation of births and deaths the same indicators are used, because of the
different nature of net-migration slightly different error measures are used. The part
discussing the population structure and the contribution of the different indicators have
for similar reasons, and in order to present the graphs more concisely other (similar)
indicators. Definitions of the error measures and the motivations for using them can be
found in the subsequent chapters.
The forecasts are mainly evaluated in terms of forecast time. This we define as the time
that passed since the start year of the forecast. In case of Forecast 1950, the forecast
time of 0-4 years refers to the yearly forecast error for the calendar period 1950 to 1954
and in case of Forecast 1970 it refers to the calendar period 1970 to 1974. Less attention
will be given to the comparison of different forecast for the same calendar period.
4.1.- Births
The Dutch population forecasts predict between twenty and fifty years ahead. End
values of the total fertility rate give the long-term expectations (see Table 1). The
highest assumptions were those of forecast 1965, which forecasted an average of more
than three children per women. Downward adjustments were made in subsequent
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forecasts. The lowest predictions were in Forecast 1984 and 1985 with only 1.50
children per woman. Thereafter, long-term forecast increase the value to 1.65 and 1.80
in the mid-nineties after which they are again lowered for some years in order to rise
again in Forecast 2000 to 1.75 (note that Forecast 1997 and 1999 are short-term
forecasts only). In Table 2, the forecasts for the year 2000 are given for the various
forecasts. The observed total fertility rate became ultimately 1.72 children per woman
(206 619 live births).

































Graphs 1 give the absolute number of births as observed and as projected. Forecasts that
are not given show similar levels and patterns as others that are listed (Forecast 1959 is
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the same as Forecast 1951; Forecast 1984 similar to Forecast 1985; Forecast 1986 as
Forecast 1987, Forecast 1988 and 1989 as Forecast 1987 and as Forecast 1990; Forecast
1991, 1993 and 1994 are nearly the same as Forecast 1992 and 1995). The error of the
forecast compared to the ex-post observed values of the total fertility rate can be seen in
Graph 2. Because the age-structure does not has an influence, patterns are in general
more smooth than with numbers of births. The fact that because of the inflow of large
cohorts in the fertile age groups the number of births can increase despite a lowering of
fertility rates is exemplified by comparing number of births and total fertility rates of
Forecast 1965 and Forecast 1970.
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Various error measures exist to express the differences between observed and forecasted
data. For the error in the number of births, in Graph 3, the mean absolute percentage
error was chosen. By using the absolute error, over and under-estimations are not
compensating each other. If percentage errors are taken, the errors between numbers of
births and total fertility rates can be compared. Furthermore, periods with a relative high
number of births are better comparable with periods with a low number of births. By
relating the error to the observed number of births, a direct imaginable indication of the
error, i.e. the percentage yearly deviation from the observed number of births in a given
period.
Graph 3 gave the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) for the first twenty years
after the start of the forecast in periods of five years. In general, the errors increase for a
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certain forecast if the forecast time increases, this is not a rule, however. The increase in
the error decreases for the forecast for which the evaluation period was long enough.
Compared to the error in first four years after the start of the forecast, the error increases
to the forecast time of 5-9 with an average factor of 2.8 and in the forecast time of 10-14
it increased with a factor of 1.5 compared to 5-9 years after the forecast start (refer to
Appendix C for more MAPEs). The average error 15-19 years was only 1.1 times larger
than the forecast time of 10-14. The differences between observed and forecasted values
vary from a few percent till way over ten percent.
The largest errors are shown for forecasts that were made before or at the beginning of
the sudden decline in fertility in the end of the sixties. Errors in the number of births can
amount to more than 50% per year (Graph 3 and Table A1 in Appendix C). Forecast
1965 even shows an error in the forecast time of fifteen to nineteen years of over 100%.
Forecast 1967 and 1970 are other forecasts that give bad results for the first twenty
years after the start of the forecast. The forecasts that made predictions for the years
before the fertility decline show errors for these years comparable to those made in
forecast made in the relative stable period after the end of the decline. Forecasts 1951
and 1975 are examples and give best results.
Because the mean absolute percentage error as shown in Graph 3 is an average, it can
not be cumulated across forecast time. The absolute percentage error can be
accumulated. Graph 4 gives an overview of the error per period of five years in forecast
time. Forecasts 1951, 1967, and 1972 were revisions of earlier forecasts and made
because observations deviated, according to the forecast makers, too much from
observed values. The revisions turned indeed out to be improvements. Forecast 1951
and 1975 give very good results. The error in the first twenty years of Forecast 1951
refers to the period until the beginning of the fertility change from relative high to low
fertility. Forecast 1975 is the forecast with the starting point in the period that starts in
the first years of the stable period with relative low fertility. Forecast made in the 80s
and 90s can only be evaluated for the first five or ten years of the forecast time.
Compared to the forecast with start years in the end of the 80s, the forecast in the first
half of the 90s do not seem to be improvements.
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Graph 3  Births: mean absolute percentage error of forecast





























































































































































By taking the percentage error absolute, the direction of the error (under or over-
estimation) is not visible anymore. Graph 5 shows the percentage error. These
indicators do give the direction of the error, though within a period of five years
positive and negative errors are compensated. If not fluctuations from year to year but
the average forecast error for a period are more important, this measure is better used
for evaluation.






































 Forecast 1975 seems to have been even more in accordance with observations than with
the pervious measures. Forecasts from the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s
give a better outcome according to this indicator. In general however, differences are
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small. Over estimation of the number of births is most common (negative values). The
six forecast following Forecast 1990 for example, all have over estimated the number of
births.

































Beside a result oriented approach that uses number of births, we could make an
evaluation on the level of assumptions, the total fertility rates. Graph 6 shows the mean
percentage error of the total fertility rate. Time-series are not available for all forecasts.
Errors in number of births and total fertility rate only differ if the age structure of
females in the fertile age-groups (15-44 years) change. As indirect effects are still minor
in the first nineteen years of the forecast time, the errors are very similar to Graph 5.
Beside a comparison in terms of forecast time, errors can be compared fore a certain
calendar period. For calendar periods of five years, Graph 7 gives the mean absolute
percentage error. The first series gives the average relative absolute error for some
forecasts for the years 1970 to 1974. For the years 1970-74 and 1975-79, forecasts made
closer to these years do not always give better results than those made earlier. Forecast
1950 and 1951 were better than those made fifteen to twenty years later. Again the
relative good fit of Forecast 1975 is apparent. The years 1980 till 1989 are more in line
with the expectation that more recent forecast could use more observations and
information and should therefore be better. Errors for the past ten years, in contrary,
give another picture, though errors are relatively small.
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The highest net-migration was measured in 1975 with over 70 thousand. This was
mainly the result of a record immigration of over 130 thousand (ten thousand of which
were due to regularizations). Net-migration was also high in the years around 1980,
1990 and 2000. Emigration was at its height in 1943 and in the fifties, while war years
showed relatively low levels. Emigration as well as immigration saw an increasing trend
the last fifty years. Yearly fluctuations were highest for immigration.
Since Forecast 1980, migration forms an integral part of the medium scenario of the
population forecast. Forecast 1965, 1967, and 1972 had zero net-migration assumptions.
Forecast 1950 and 1970 had each an explorative variant in which the effects of
migration were estimated. Of these forecast the version with zero migration are taken in
the evaluation. In the other three forecasts made before Forecast 1980 (Forecast 1951,
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1959, 1975) it is not clear which should be taken as the most likely base-line forecast. In
the evaluation, the versions with migration are used. As appendix a short overview is
given about the migration history of the Netherlands. Refer to this Appendix A for
graphs on observed immigration and emigration in the past 100 years.
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In Graphs 8a and 8b net-migration assumptions are plotted against observed values for
some forecasts. Forecast with explicit and implicit zero net-migration assumptions are
not listed, neither are those that do not differ significantly from the previous or the next
forecast. Forecast 1987 and 1989 only differ for the short-term from Forecast 1988;
Forecast 1990 and 1992 are similar to Forecast 1991; Forecast 1995 does not differ
much from Forecast 1994 (Forecast 1997 and 1999 are short-term forecast only).
Numbers of births and deaths are always positive and never zero. The average
percentage error and mean absolute percentage error can give an indication of the error
for these components. The number of net-migrants can, both in the observations and in
the forecast, equal or close to zero. In such situations relative measures give problems.
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If the forecasted net-migration is zero and the observed not zero, the error will always
be 100%, regardless the size of the difference (if taken as percentage of the
observations). Additionally, small errors can give large relative errors if net-migration is
low. If fore example the observed number of net-migration is one thousand and the
forecast expected five thousand, the relative error is 400%. If the observed number was
ten thousand and the forecast four thousand, the error is six thousand but the relative
error will only be 60%. Fore this reason the use of the mean absolute error is better.
Because the number of net-migration tents to fluctuate from year to year, the main aim
of forecasting migration is more to forecast the average of a period accurately and not
so much the yearly fluctuations. By not taking the mean absolute error but the mean
error, positive and negative errors compensate for each other, which gives a better
indication of the error. Another possibility is the absolute difference of the net-
migration for a period of some years. Over and under estimations cancel each other out
within a period. For migration this absolute mean error will mainly be used. The error is
defined as forecast minus observation.
Graph 9, gives the absolute mean error for forecast time 0-4, 5-9 and 0-9 years (refer to
Table A2 in Appendix C for more data). For the short-term, a clear improvement in
predicting net-migration does not appear from forecast to forecast. For this period,
Forecast 1995 and 1990 gave the best fit. The forecasts made from the mid-80s onward
seem to improve in predicting the forecast time of 5-9 years; the smallest errors were
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reached by Forecast 1987 and beyond. The implicit assumption of zero migration of
Forecast 1950 also gave a relative low error for this forecast time period. Again five
years further in forecast time, Forecast 1950 even gave the best results (only forecasts
with a start year before 1986 can be evaluated for 10-14 years). For the referring
calendar period (1955-64), net-migration fluctuated around zero. In later forecasts that,
explicitly or implicitly, used the assumption of zero-migration were much less accurate.
Graph 9  Net-migration: absolute mean forecast error in forecast time












































































The absolute average forecast error for the first ten years after the start of the forecast
gives similar results (lower panel of graph). The compensation for over and under
estimation across a period of ten years turned out to work most favourable for Forecast
1980.
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Graph 10  shows the sum of the absolute error for periods of five years in forecast time.
The different five-year periods after the start of the forecast can now be cumulated.
Negative and positive values within a period do not compensate each other. For forecast
time 0-4 years, recent forecasts do not seem to have improved in upon earlier forecasts.
As far as evaluations can be made for forecast time 5-9, the last forecast have smaller
errors than those made before Forecast 1987.
The direction of the error is nearly always negative (Graph 11), meaning that in general
net-migration was under-estimated in the migration forecasts. Beside Forecast 1950
(zero migration assumption), only Forecast 1980 and Forecasts 1991 to 1994  had over-
estimated the net-migration, and they did so only in the first five years after the start of
the respective forecasts.
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As with births, we can also evaluate the migration forecasts in terms of (five-year)
calendar periods. The absolute mean forecast error are shown in Graph 12.

















































Again forecasts made closer to the period under study do not necessarily give better
results than those made further in the past. An improvement in time is neither visible for
the past twenty years, errors for calendar years 1980-84 are similar than those for period
1995-99.
As described in chapter 2, some forecast had a version with and without explicit
migration assumptions and some explorative forecasts were made. The zero-migration
assumption had been better for Forecast 1950 and 1959 than the variant with migration
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(refer to Table A2b for absolute mean error of these alternative forecasts). The
explorative variant of Forecast 1970 would have been better than the base-line forecast
with zero-migration. Forecast 1975 did rightfully not chose for the assumption of zero
migration.
4.3.- Deaths
The number of deaths shows a continuously increasing trend (Graph 13). This is a result
of a growing population, especially of the older age-groups. The increase of the number
of deaths has been offset partly by improved life-expectancies. The trend in female life-
expectancies has been going up since 1950, though from year to year some fluctuations
could be observed. At the end of the 60s, it seemed as if the increase would come to an
end, however, in the 70s the up-ward trend recovered. In the 80s the improvements
slowed down again and it is not clear if further improvements will take place.
Fore males developments in life-expectancy at birth are less favourable. After some
hesitating increases in the 50s, even a decline followed in the 60s. In the early 70s the
trend recovered and life-expectancies have been increasing from then onward.
Differences between males and females were 2.3 years in 1950. The gap first widened
to 6.7 years before narrowing to 5.0 in 2000. According to Forecast 2000 the difference
would further reduce to a difference of about three years in 2050.
For some forecasts the number of deaths are plotted in Graph 13. Observed and
forecasted life-expectancies are shown in Graph 14. Forecasts that are not shown, have
predicted values similar to others. Forecast 1965 is nearly the same as 1967; Forecast
1985 as 1984; Forecast 1987 to 1986; Forecast 1989, 1990, and 1991 to Forecast 1988;
Forecast 1993, 1994, 1995 to Forecast 1992. In the graph with life-expectancies, years
with the same end-values are neither shown.
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As with total fertility rates for the birth component, the aggregated indicator of life
expectancy at birth gives information on the aptness of the main mortality assumptions.
The number of deaths also includes indirect errors (wrong age structure) and errors in
the translation of life-expectancies into age-specific mortality rates. From a quick scan
of these graphs it becomes clear that most forecast before the mid-80s under-estimated
improvements in health. Life expectancies improved in general more and for a longer
period than forecasted.
For a more quantitative comparison of the forecast we can look at the error measures. In
Graph 15, the mean absolute percentage error per five year period of forecast time
(refer to introduction of this chapter for definition of forecast time) are given for the
number of deaths. This measure was earlier used in the discussion on the fertility
component and gives the yearly percentage difference between the forecast and the
observations.
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Graph 15  Mortality: mean absolute percentage error

























































































































Forecasts with starting years in the fifties and seventies appear to have been the least
accurate mortality forecasts. These forecasts had been too pessimistic about
improvements in the life expectancy. In the first five years after the start of the
forecasts, Forecast 1980 and 1996 have the lowest error. Of all forecasts that could be
evaluated for forecast time 5-9 years, the three most recent (Forecast 1989, 1990, and
1991) gave better results for the second than for the first five-year period of forecast
time. All other forecast satisfy the expectation that errors increase according as the
forecast time passes.







































































Graph 16 gives the absolute percentage error which can be accumulated. If fluctuations
from year to year are not so important but the average across a forecast time of five
years is more relevant, this measure can give a better impression. The direction of the
error in each period of five years becomes clear in Graph 17 where the mean percentage
error is shown. Negative values mean an over estimation of mortality. For some
forecasts the effect of the balancing of over and under estimation in a period of five
years improves the score. Fore example, for the forecast time of 5-9 years, the error
nearly disappeared for Forecast 1989 and Forecast 1990.



























































Beside the above more result oriented approach of the comparison of number of deaths
we can evaluate at the assumption level by looking at the life expectancies at birth.
Indirect effects on the error caused by error in the number of births, net-migration or
base population are now excluded (but errors caused by transformation of life
expectancies into probabilities of dying are neglected). Graphs 18a and 18b give for
those forecasts for which data were available the mean percentage error (negative values
mean that the forecasted life expectancy at was too low). Conclusions are similar as
drawn from comparing forecasts by number of deaths. Errors are in general larger for
assumptions made for female than for male life expectancies. The error in the first five
years after the start of the forecast are small, especially since the 80s; the average for
forecasts 1980 till 1995 was 0.12% for male and 0.33% for female life expectancies at
birth.
























































Compared to number of deaths, errors in life expectancies at birth are much smaller.
Indirect effects can have a negative influence on error of the number of birth, however,
the reason for the difference is mainly caused by the method of calculation of the life
expectancy.
As with births and migration we can compare the mortality forecasts for calendar
periods. Graph 19 gives the mean absolute percentage error for calendar periods of five
years. As seen with the other components, nearness to the calendar period under study is
no guarantee for smaller errors. This is mainly the result of the relative bad forecasts in
the 50s and 70s. Although later years satisfy more the expectation that more recent
forecasts predict better than more distant forecast for a certain calendar period, it does
not seem to be a real clear benefit.
4.4.- Population structure
From 1950 to the beginning of 70s the annual population growth was over one percent
(Graph 20). Afterwards the growth rate fluctuated around 0.6 percent. As births and
deaths show a relative stable pattern, it is mainly the strong fluctuating migration
component that causes most of the changes in the yearly population growth.
From Forecast 1975 onward, all forecasts predict an ultimate decline of the total
population (refer to table *tp01*). From forecast to forecast, each time the turning point
has been put further in the future (from 2003 in Forecast 1975 to 2040 in Forecast
2000).
The maximum population size (of 21 million) for the year 2000 was assumed in
Forecast 1965. Forecast 1975 and 1984 expected the lowest total population, only 15.1
million. In the end, the population registers gave 15.68 million for the first of January
2000. In Forecast 1990 this had been foreseen correctly, while Forecast 1972 came
close.
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The mean yearly percentage forecast error of the total population in forecast time are
given in Graph 21. Since the first forecast, no improvement seems visible for the first
five years after the start of the respective forecasts. The smallest error had Forecast
1970, 1990 and 1995 while Forecast 1993, 1994, and 1967 showed the biggest forecast
error. Five to ten years after the start of the forecast, errors are in general larger; on
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average 0.9 against 0.28 in the first five years. Errors do not always point in the same
direction. Because of this forecast that score relatively bad in the first five forecast years
do not necessarily have the largest in the second period of five years. Fore example,
Forecast 1967 gave in the period five to nine years after the start of the forecast the
smallest error (while it was one of the worst in the forecast time 0-4 years). Ten to
fifteen years after the start of the forecast the average error of the forecast for which a
comparison can be made, increased to 2.42 percent. Again five years further in forecast
time the errors have increased to 4.34. Note that errors can only be calculated up till
Forecast 1980.



































The goal of a population forecast is the prediction of the future population and
population structure. Because of this we mainly evaluate the forecasts against errors
between observed and forecasted population. The problem with the error in the total
population, however, is that an accumulation of errors can occur. If the population
growth was forecasted wrongly for the first year but correctly in all subsequent years,
the total population will show an error for all these years. An evaluation of the error in
the population growth does not suffer from this problem. Graph 22 gives the mean
percentage forecast error of the population growth. The picture is more or less the same,
though in detail some differences can be observed. Forecast 1990 gives the smallest
error and Forecast 1950 improves compares relatively better. Errors between observed
and forecasted population can not only accumulate, levelling of errors is also possible.
For some forecasts score better in the inter-forecast comparison for population growth.
Especially Forecast 1967 and 1980 and forecasts made in the beginning of the 90s show
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larger errors in the comparison of the population growth than in the comparison of the
error in the total population.



































Forecasts are not (only) made for predicting the total population. Forecasting the
population structure is often more important. Predicting the total population accurately
does not necessarily mean that the underlying population structure was forecasted
correctly as well. Over estimations at certain ages can compensate for under estimations
at other ages. By aggregating the errors made for each age group of five year, we can
get a better picture of the error in the population structure. Graph 23 shows the mean
absolute percentage forecast error for the population in five year age groups fore
forecasts times of five years. Again we can conclude that forecasts for the short-term
were relatively good and that errors are comparable from forecast to forecast.
Differences in errors become larger after the first five-year period of forecast time. The
average error increases from 0.55% in the first five years after the start year of the
forecast to 1.9% and 4.8% in the subsequent five-year periods. Especially the forecasts
of the 70s and Forecast 1980 performed worse in the error in the age structure than the
error in the total population. In these forecasts, over-estimation of the number of births
was compensated by under-estimation of migration and of the increase in the life
expectancy.
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Whereas Graph 23 gave an overview of the sum error in the age structure, Graph 24
gives the error for broad age group. In order to keep a convenient arrangement, three
broad age groups are chosen that represent more or less the education, work, and
pension ages (younger than 20, 20-64 years and 65 and older). Because between 1950
and 2000 the total population increased by 57%, a weighted error measures is more
suitable to make e a comparison between forecasts in this time period. As error measure
we have chosen for the mean error as a percentage of the average total population in the
period under consideration. By taking the total population as divider, the errors of the
age groups can be cumulated. Because negative errors in one age group can compensate
positive errors in another age group, the error in the total population is also given.
The size of the three broad age groups is no equal. A larger error in age group 20-64
compared to age group 0-19, does not mean that in relative terms the forecast for this
age group was worse. Graphs 25 shows the absolute mean percentage forecast errors in
forecast time.
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From Graphs 24 and 25 it again becomes clear that no improvements have been made
from past to present. More experience in making forecasts has not lead to smaller errors.
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Not that there is much space for improvement, the error is 0.6% for the age group 0-19
and around 0.3% for the age groups 20-64 and 65 and over. In forecast time, errors
increase (note that the scale differs for each period of five years of forecast time). The
increase in the error in forecast time is largest for the youngest age group. The average
error five to nine years after the start of the forecast is about 3% and for the two other
age groups around 1%. Another five years further in forecast time, errors again increase.
For the age groups 0-19, 20-64, and 65 and over to 9.5%, 2.1%, and 2.6% respectively.
For most forecasts the error is relatively largest for the 0-19 year olds. In the first
forecast time period of five years, four of the twenty forecasts have a larger error for the
broad age group of 20-64 year old (Forecast 1967, 1972, 1986 and 1987). After a
forecast time of five to nine years this only counts for two forecasts (1986 and 1987)
and after ten to fourteen years only Forecast 1986 shows a larger error for age group 20-
64. In this Forecast 1986 the forecast of the youngest age group was most accurate.
Because the population size of the age group 65 years and older is relatively small,
errors seem small in Graph 25. Graph 25 gives a better picture. The predictions for age
group 65 and older is slightly more often larger than that of the 20-59 year olds. The
average error however, is more or less the same for both groups.
Errors in the younger age groups are mainly caused by errors in the fertility
assumptions. Compared to deaths and migrants, births are unique in the sense that they
all enter in one age group, namely age group zero. The two other components influence
all age groups. Because of the concentration in one age group, the disturbance in the age
structure is larger for the birth component. At higher ages de assumptions about life
expectancy at birth and the resulting change in the probabilities of dying at higher ages
are most important.
Graph 26 gives the mean percentage forecast error for five year periods of forecast time
of the three demographic components. Indirect effects are not taken into account.
Examples of such effects are more deaths because of more immigration or more births.
On the short and middle-term, these errors will be relatively small.
Errors in births correspond with errors in the age-group 0-19 years (compare Graph 26
and Graph 24, where a positive error in the birth assumptions leads to a negative error
in the population). Only in the long-term (19 years and beyond) these births move to
next broad age group. Deaths have most influence on the population of 65 and older and
net-migration is relatively more influential in the age-group of the economic active.
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In general, the birth component produces the largest error. Also changes in migration do
not always seem to be easily predictable. Forecasts with start years in the 70s know a
relatively large error in the mortality component. Combined errors in Forecast 1984 and
1985 were relatively large because all three components pointed in the same direction.
Compensation caused a reduction in the error in the total population in other forecasts.
For example, Forecast 1970 and 1972 seem to be quite accurate when evaluated in
terms of total population, the errors underlying structure and in the components were
one of the largest. In the first five years after the start of the forecast, the oldest forecasts
benefit most from this effect. Five to nine years after the start of the forecast the
compensation effect is in general higher. Now more recent forecast also benefit,
although errors in the components are relatively small, the error of the total population
is a bit a flattered.





























































Again we can also look at the forecast performance for calendar years. Graph 27 gives
the mean absolute percentage forecast error for the total population for five year
forecast time periods. Most often forecast made closer to the calendar period under
consideration show a better result. However, as we have seen before with the
components, more recent forecast do not always give better results. Examples are
Forecast 1980 for the period 1990-1995 and Forecast 1990 for the period 1995-2000.
Graph 28 shows for the 90s an overview of the age groups 0-19 and 65 and older.
Changes in mortality are more gradual leading to better results for more recent
forecasts. The birth component seems less predictable and adjustments for the short-
term were often in the wrong direction or too strong.



































































There are some problems in comparing forecasts’ performance. The period in which the
forecast was made and period after making the forecast differ. Uncertainty about future
trends and variance in recent trends are not the same at the time of making each
forecast. Many errors measures exist and each could give a different outcome.
Comparisons and evaluation always have to be seen in this perspective. In addition, the
goal of a forecast is not to predict the exact changes from year to year. More important
than following the yearly fluctuations is the trend across some years.
The fertility forecasts had problems with predicting the developments for the transition
period from relative high fertility up till 1965 to low fertility levels after 1975. Crucial
was how much of the decline or increase in fertility rates was attributable to change in
age pattern and how to decline in ultimate number of children per woman. The total
fertility rate is a period measure by changing age patterns of fertility this can lead to
biases if we interpret it as a proxy for the ultimate number of children per woman. In the
beginning of the sixties woman became mother at younger ages. This lead to an increase
in the total fertility rate and to an over estimation of the expected ultimate number of
children per woman. In the seventies and eighties the opposite happened; woman started
postponing their children and stayed childless until much higher ages. This lead to an
under estimation of the ultimate number of children per woman and to an over
estimation of childlessness.
Another problem is how fast in the making of a new forecast one should adjust
according to new developments. The distinction between temporary fluctuations and
changes in trend is crucial. In the 90s, such cyclical fluctuations were, wrongly, partly
interpreted as changes in trend.
In the previous century, 6.0 million immigrants were registered against 5.2 million
emigrants. After World War II, the Netherlands was at first an emigration country.
Since 1967 however, net-migration has not been negative. It took some time before it
was realised that the Netherlands had become a permanent immigration country.
The explorative variant of Forecast 1950 and the alternative version of Forecast 1951
and 1959 were rightfully put at negative net-migration for the short-term (net-migration
for the 1950s as a whole was –130 thousand). However, the level was too much directed
by government policy that assumed a yearly departure of 50 thousand persons. Because
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of this, the versions with zero migration assumptions gave after all a better result. For
later forecast the assumption of zero migration was not a good choice.
In post war Netherlands, the economic recovery went off faster than had been expected
in the first forecasts and less persons left and more came. Labour-migrants were brought
to the Netherlands from the so called recruitment countries. Wrongly it was at first
assumed that settlement would be temporary. Even with a downward business cycle,
and against expectation, only a limited return migration took place. In Forecast 1975
some attention was given to this possibility, but adjustments were not made for the
long-term migration forecast. Forecast 1986 stated explicitly that the Netherlands
would, for the time being,  keep on being an immigration country. Long-term
assumptions were nevertheless put at zero net-migration. The next forecast, for the first
time long-term net-migration levels were not put at zero and from then onward
migration becomes an important component in the population forecasts. Until Forecast
1994, however, all forecasts assumed that in the short-term, migration levels would
decline compared to the last observed values. Now and then though, long-term
assumptions were raised.
From forecast to forecast each time it seemed that adjustments were too small. Large
fluctuations and periodically strong declines of net-migration made interpretation of the
trend difficult; the distinction between trend and short-term cyclical changes appeared
complicated. From Forecast 1987 onward, term trends were rightfully not adjusted
every year to recent observations.
The inflow of asylum seekers and refugees was initially not seen as permanent, or at
least not as increasing. Phenomena like family reunion and family formation with
foreign partners were noticed and predicted early, but each time it was assumed that
restrictive government policy would reduce the flows. These interventions only had a
short-term effect. Influences of changes in government policies and the law do have a
stronger and more direct effect on migration than on mortality.
The life expectancy at birth has more than doubled in the past 150 years. Life extending
factors such as public health system, medical knowledge and technology, hygiene and
preventive medicine improved. Traffic regulations, laws regulating working conditions,
the quality of housing, and personal life style more directed towards health, all have
contributed to the decline in mortality.
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In comparison with births and, especially, migration, the pattern of mortality from year
to year is stable. With each new forecast, the long-term mortality assumptions have not
always been adjusted. Since Forecast 1970, male life expectancies have been raised in
small steps at a time. Despite (slightly) larger errors in female life expectancies,
adjustments were less frequent.
Male mortality rates increased during the 60s and beginning of the 70s. These
developments were wrongly seen as permanent. During the 70s the male mortality rates
started to decline again and life expectancies started a continuous increase. Female life
expectancies at birth showed a constant rise in the period under investigation. It
appeared difficult to predict for how long this trend would prolong. Short-term changes
were sometimes wrongly taken as signs of structural changes. From forecast 1984
onward, female life expectancies were underestimated. Long-term male levels were
under-estimated. The forecast of the number of births reflects the same. For the middle
and long-term they are more often over estimated. In contrary, from the 80s onward
numbers of death for the short-term were most often under-estimated. Forecast with
start years in the 50s and 70s gave worse results.
Methodology didn’t change much. An attempt to include causes of death explicitly in
the forecast model didn’t give the expected results. Together with medical and
technological developments, life-style is an important factor influencing death rates.
The effects of life-style will often only influence the death rates after some years.
Changes in smoking behaviour appeared to be a very strong predictor of developments
in mortality and could also explain to a significant extent the differences between males
and female levels of life expectancies.
The main question remains for how long life expectancies continue to rise and to what
levels. The last years a stabilisation seems to take place, especially by female life
expectancies. Improvements at (very) high ages is limited or absent. Therefore, a
continuation of rising trends does not seem obvious.
The total population was forecasted accurately by Forecast 1972 and 1980. But a small
error in the forecast of the total population does not mean that the assumptions basic to
the forecast were correct. Because of compensating effects between age groups, caused
by the three demographic components, the underlying age structure have large errors.
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Forecast 1972, fore example, had wrong assumptions but because errors were
compensating each other it predicted (by accident) the total population quite accurately.
Errors in the three broad age-groups (0-19, 20-64, and 65 and over) correlate with errors
in the three components. The birth component is for the first twenty years exclusively
related to the youngest age group. Mortality is especially an important factor for the
population at pension ages. Migration has a stronger effect on the population in the
economic active age-group (20-64 years). The youngest age-group gave most problems.
Errors are mainly related to wrong assumptions on fertility. Changes in age-patterns and
ultimate number of children per woman appeared difficult to distinguish (postponement
or abandonment). Foreseeing the changes in net-migration was also relatively
problematic. The strong fluctuations from year to year tended to increase the error, but
also over a longer period changes were difficult to predict. Too often were settlement
and the increase in flows seen as temporarily. The forecasting of mortality was the
easiest of the three components and lead to the smallest errors. Because of the
concentration of the error at higher ages, the percentage error for this age-group is
similar to that of the age group 20 to 64 years. The worsening of the mortality trend in
the 60s and early 70s was wrongly seen as a permanent change. Since then
improvements beyond the short-term have in general been under-estimated, though
adjustments did most often mean an improvement.
Significant improvements in short-term forecasts were not made during the fifty years
of forecast practice. Hence it seems that methodological changes and more data and
surveys has not been of much use. Improvements will also be difficult to achieve as
forecast errors are already small. Most gain can therefore be achieved at young age
groups by improving fertility forecasts and at the working age group by predicting net-
migration more accurately. It is therefore better to concentrate on assumption making of
the middle and long-term for these two components.
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Appendix A: Migration in the Netherlands
In the beginning of the 20th century more people were still leaving than coming to the
Netherlands (Graph A1). Beside streams between neighbouring countries, migration
consisted mainly of emigration to the traditional settlement colonies (North-America,
South-Africa, and Australia and New Zealand). World War I changed things drastically;
migration stopped and refugees came from Belgium (many of which were not
registered). After the First World War most refugees returned. The worsening of the
labour-market in the United States and in Germany resulted in immigration from these
countries. During the Great Depression immigration slowed down again.
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At the end of the 30s many refugees, especially Jewish, came from Germany. During
the German occupation migration came to a stand still. The deportation during World
War II of mainly Jews lead to a peak in the outflow of people. After the capitulation of
Japan, many migrants came back from the Dutch Indies (currently Indonesia). First
some Dutch also headed to the former colony but after re-colonisation seemed
impossible most returned. After change of sovereignty, again some hoped to make a
new start in Indonesia but after the crisis around New Guinea they returned. The group
of more than 18 thousand South Moluccans (that had fought alongside the Dutch against
the Indonesian freedom fighters) that arrived in 1951 were only registered as
immigrants in 1958.
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After the World War II, many Dutch sought a future in the traditional settlement
colonies (mainly Canada and Australia). This migration flow lasted until the end of the
50s. After the improved economy in the Netherlands, immigration and emigration
streams with these countries become more balanced. In the 60s the economic situation
in Surname became worse and with the improved Dutch economy more and more
immigrants came from Suriname. This increased rapidly once the first negotiations
about independence started. In 1975, the year of Suriname’s independence, the flow
reached it’s peak. In the period of transition during which Surinamese could settle reely
in the Netherlands many more opted for the Netherlands.
In 1960, the Dutch and Italian government signed the first labour recruitment
agreement. Spain, Portugal followed immediately and slightly afterwards Turkey and
Greece followed by Morocco, Yugoslavia and Tunisia. The so called guest workers kept
on coming during periods of economic downturn, also when the large stream, and
potential labour force, came from Suriname. At first the labour migrants came alone but
shortly afterwards spouses and children joined and settlement turned out to be less
temporary than assumed at first. The assumption that these labour migrants would leave
again in periods of economic downturn turned out to be largely unfounded. In 1975, by










1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Net-migration
x 1000
In 1973 no new working permits were issued to Turks and Moroccans, however, family
reunion continued. Later family formative migration emerged, which at the end of the
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eighties became an important part of immigration from the former recruitment
countries. The determent policy at the end of the 80s (for example visa requirement for
Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans, minimum income in case of family formative
migration) resulted in a strong temporary decline in migration. Soon, however,
immigration started to increase again. After again a tightening up of immigration
regulations and an economic downturn, net-migration started to decline again. However,
since the low of 1995, again an increase was registered. The high number of emigration
in 1996 was mainly the result of administrative corrections.
Beside the Belgium refugees of the WW I and refugees from Germany and eastern-
Europe before WW II some thousands refugees came from Hungary in 1956 and from
Czechoslovakia in 1968. From the mid-80s the number of asylum seekers increased
continuously. New conflicts and wars lead to new groups of refugees and asylum
seekers (for example, Somalia in 1989 and especially 1994-95, Sri Lanka around 1990,
Yugoslavia from 1991 onward, Rumania until 1994, Iran in and around 1994,
Afghanistan and Iraq from 1993, Turkey from 1997, and the former Soviet Union since
the political changes of  ‘die Wende’.
Step by step the Netherlands had chanted from an emigration country into an
immigration country. Various determent policies and tightening of immigration rules
could not offset this process. Since 1967, net-migration has not been negative again.
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Appendix B: Error measures used
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Appendix C: Forecast Errors
Table A1 Births: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
forecast time (in years)
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 0-9 10-19 0-19
1950 9.1 14.4 19.3 15.6 9.7 11.7 17.5 14.6
1951 1.3 2.5 7.8 2.4 26.4 1.9 5.1 3.5
1959 6.4 4.6 11.2 45.1 5.5 28.2 16.8
1965 13.0 50.6 97.0 108.6 31.8 102.8 67.3
1967 3.3 36.6 55.2 65.7 59.2 19.9 60.5 40.2
1970 20.5 54.9 57.2 50.4 42.2 37.7 53.8 45.8
1972 16.1 32.9 30.9 20.8 16.3 24.5 25.9 25.2
1975 0.7 6.2 7.2 0.5 6.2 3.5 3.9 3.7
1980 6.1 7.2 4.3 4.8 6.6 4.5 5.6
1984 5.1 11.0 9.9 8.0
1985 4.3 9.2 10.0 6.7
1986 2.1 2.3 5.1 2.2
1987 1.3 3.9 2.6
1988 1.7 2.6 2.1
1989 3.6 2.1 2.9
1990 1.7 3.6 2.7







1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
1950 19.3 15.6 9.7 25.8
1951 7.2 3.6 17.8 47.8
1959 7.2 3.6 17.8 47.8
1965 13.0 50.6 97.0 108.6
1967 19.0 52.5 62.5 62.4 58.6 68.2
1970 20.5 54.9 57.2 50.4 42.2 48.4
1972 33.9 31.4 25.1 16.2 12.9
1975 0.7 6.2 7.2 0.5 6.2
1980 6.1 7.2 4.3 4.8
1984 6.8 11.2 11.1











Table A2a Net-Migration: Absolute Mean Error (AME)
forecast time (in years)
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 0-9 10-19 0-19
1950 20.2 6.7 6.5 10.7 28.0 13.4 8.6 2.4
1951 24.8 41.8 62.8 63.6 85.7 33.3 63.2 48.3
1959 20.4 29.4 45.4 24.9
1965 10.7 28.0 37.8 16.1 27.2 19.3 27.0 23.2
1967 16.2 33.4 33.1 11.5 37.4 24.8 22.3 23.6
1970 28.0 37.8 16.1 27.2 41.1 32.9 21.7 27.3
1972 33.4 33.1 11.5 37.4 27.7 33.3 24.5 28.9
1975 17.8 10.1 13.9
1980 9.6 15.8 33.2 21.8 3.1 27.5 15.3
1984 19.8 42.5 24.4 31.1
1985 16.3 41.1 28.4 28.7
1986 11.9 22.2 27.4 17.0
1987 11.9 7.7 9.8
1988 16.8 4.6 10.7
1989 18.7 4.2 11.4
1990 4.1 3.4 3.8







1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
1950 6.5 10.7 28.0 37.8
1951 56.5 60.7 78.0 87.8
1959 26.5 30.7 48.0
1965 10.7 28.0 37.8 16.1 27.2 41.1 28.4
1967 28.0 37.8 16.1 27.2 41.1 28.4
1970 28.0 37.8 16.1 27.2 41.1 28.4
1972 37.8 16.1 27.2 41.1 28.4
1975 17.8 10.1
1980 9.6 15.8 33.2 21.8
1984 25.2 41.1 28.4











Table A2b Net-migration: absolute mean error of Alternative Forecasts (x1000)
forecast time (in years)
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 0-9 10-19 0-19
1950 29.8 43.3 56.5 60.7 78.0 36.6 58.6 47.6
1951 25.2 8.2 12.8 13.6 35.7 16.7 13.2 1.7
1959 0.4 9.4 25.4 4.9
1970 8.3
1975 37.8 16.1 27.2 41.1 28.4 27.0 34.1 30.6
calendar period
1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89
1950 29.8 43.3 56.5 60.7 78.0 87.8
1951 6.7 6.5 10.7 28.0 37.8
1959 6.5 10.7 28.0
1970 39.8
1975 37.8 16.1 27.2
68
Table A3 Deaths: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
forecast time (in years)
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 0-9 10-19 0-19
1950 7.1 11.0 12.0 10.2 10.9 9.0 11.1 10.1
1951 8.4 8.6 6.3 2.9 3.8 8.5 4.6 6.6
1959 5.1 10.8 18.1 17.7 8.0 17.9 12.9
1965 1.9 3.5 3.6 4.0 2.7 3.8 3.3
1967 3.3 2.8 3.2 2.5 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.0
1970 3.0 10.0 15.5 15.3 14.9 6.5 15.4 10.9
1972 4.7 13.3 14.4 15.4 14.1 9.0 14.9 11.9
1975 5.7 9.7 10.3 11.2 12.8 7.7 10.7 9.2
1980 0.7 2.0 4.4 7.9 1.4 6.1 3.8
1984 2.3 4.9 2.0 3.6
1985 1.5 2.6 1.7 2.0
1986 1.7 2.1 3.1 1.9
1987 1.0 1.9 1.5
1988 1.6 1.9 1.8
1989 1.9 1.0 1.5
1990 1.6 1.0 1.3







1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
1950 12.0 10.2 10.9 17.4
1951 7.1 3.7 3.1 8.3
1959 5.9 12.9 18.1 17.6
1965 1.9 3.5 3.6 4.0
1967 3.9 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.1 1.6
1970 3.0 10.0 15.5 15.3 14.9 15.6
1972 9.9 14.9 14.8 14.4 15.2
1975 5.7 9.7 10.3 11.2 12.8
1980 0.7 2.0 4.4 7.9
1984 3.3 4.4 1.6











Table A4 Total Population: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
forecast time (in years)
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 0-9 10-19 0-19
1950 0.147 1.127 3.302 5.630 7.205 0.637 4.466 2.551
1965 0.387 2.267 6.380 11.501 17.247 1.327 8.941 5.134
1967 0.470 0.342 2.025 5.058 7.728 0.406 3.541 1.974
1970 0.254 1.409 3.361 5.378 6.085 0.832 4.369 2.601
1972 0.295 0.094 0.836 0.793 0.086 0.194 0.814 0.504
1975 0.162 0.706 0.781 2.350 3.899 0.434 1.565 1.000
1980 0.337 0.674 0.277 0.838 0.506 0.557 0.531
1984 0.396 1.970 3.408 1.183
1985 0.368 1.963 3.315 1.166
1986 0.125 0.835 1.503 0.480
1987 0.128 0.557 0.343
1988 0.257 0.628 0.442
1989 0.415 0.746 0.580
1990 0.053 0.149 0.101







1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
1950 2.812 5.233 6.997 7.475
1965 0.231 1.692 5.467 10.359 16.171 21.330 27.840
1967 0.512 0.774 3.058 6.266 8.554 11.199
1970 1.060 2.902 5.091 5.983 6.988
1972 0.260 0.292 0.986 0.465 0.198
1975 0.715 0.633 1.990 3.532
1980 0.714 0.289 0.655












Table A5 Population 0-19: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
forecast time (in years)
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 0-9 10-19 0-19
1950 0.941 4.133 9.076 14.443 16.704 2.537 11.759 7.148
1965 1.540 8.152 23.527 45.687 72.886 4.846 34.607 19.727
1967 0.448 2.530 11.427 25.684 42.333 1.489 18.556 10.022
1970 1.097 8.297 19.425 33.512 43.575 4.697 26.469 15.583
1972 0.474 4.577 11.375 17.725 20.709 2.526 14.550 8.538
1975 0.214 0.773 0.958 0.331 1.506 0.493 0.644 0.569
1980 0.830 2.636 2.689 2.848 1.733 2.769 2.251
1984 0.936 4.755 8.193 2.845
1985 0.882 4.284 7.288 2.583
1986 0.070 0.338 0.867 0.204
1987 0.163 0.314 0.238
1988 0.625 1.273 0.949
1989 0.875 1.619 1.247
1990 0.129 0.223 0.176







1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
1950 7.990 13.470 16.839 13.383
1965 0.927 6.160 19.883 40.503 67.676 91.539 106.528
1967 0.587 5.654 16.286 32.388 47.987 55.129
1970 6.447 16.797 30.822 42.378 44.403
1972 1.619 6.912 14.205 19.641 19.540
1975 0.803 0.866 0.423 1.016
1980 2.458 2.714 2.951












Table A6 Population 20-64: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
forecast time (in years)
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 0-9 10-19 0-19
1950 0.490 1.244 1.119 0.550 1.113 0.867 0.834 0.851
1965 0.347 1.089 2.141 3.059 3.065 0.718 2.600 1.659
1967 0.559 1.495 2.544 3.311 4.574 1.027 2.928 1.977
1970 0.686 1.918 3.120 4.310 5.429 1.302 3.715 2.508
1972 0.526 1.799 2.859 4.379 5.792 1.162 3.619 2.391
1975 0.052 0.387 0.819 2.495 3.954 0.219 1.657 0.938
1980 0.154 0.013 1.091 1.950 0.083 1.521 0.719
1984 0.300 1.502 2.668 0.901
1985 0.252 1.571 2.684 0.912
1986 0.144 1.011 1.726 0.578
1987 0.086 0.594 0.340
1988 0.216 0.672 0.444
1989 0.370 0.675 0.523
1990 0.086 0.027 0.029







1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
1950 1.183 0.665 0.731 3.713
1965 0.267 0.905 1.908 2.915 3.174 1.859 3.666
1967 0.905 1.908 2.915 3.721 4.939 2.960
1970 1.640 2.915 4.017 5.420 3.604
1972 1.015 2.281 3.372 5.189 5.454
1975 0.367 0.628 2.121 3.641
1980 0.168 0.834 1.758












Table A7 Population 65+: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
forecast time (in years)
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 0-9 10-19 0-19
1950 0.753 2.652 4.720 6.288 7.167 1.702 5.504 3.603
1965 0.203 0.263 0.350 1.397 2.157 0.233 0.873 0.553
1967 0.191 0.228 0.804 1.662 2.447 0.210 1.233 0.721
1970 0.168 1.696 4.451 7.235 9.921 0.932 5.843 3.387
1972 0.556 2.833 5.481 8.291 10.756 1.694 6.886 4.290
1975 0.759 2.539 4.280 6.206 7.978 1.649 5.243 3.446
1980 0.077 0.272 1.163 2.366 0.174 1.764 0.969
1984 0.268 1.118 1.854 0.693
1985 0.132 0.549 0.959 0.341
1986 0.314 0.924 1.626 0.619
1987 0.241 0.846 0.544
1988 0.304 0.758 0.531
1989 0.248 0.511 0.380
1990 0.247 0.605 0.426







1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
1950 5.394 7.746 8.143 9.790
1965 0.218 0.262 0.208 1.210 2.023 2.625 2.837
1967 0.262 0.208 1.210 2.023 2.625 2.837
1970 1.232 3.892 6.686 9.402 11.794
1972 1.301 3.904 6.635 9.319 11.652
1975 2.192 3.927 5.822 7.607
1980 0.170 0.948 2.083
1984 0.268 1.118 1.854
1985 0.444 0.947
1986 0.674 1.282
1987 0.480 1.110
1988 0.420 0.790
1989 0.248 0.511
1990 0.576
1991 0.532
1992 0.541
1993 0.518
1994 0.291
